Trade Facilitation Network (TFN) Research Team Under the supervision of Muhammad Anwar, Founder & Chairman, TFN 13 September 2026

The 2026 BRICS New Delhi Declaration speaks firmly about the conditions needed for international trade. Paragraph 20 calls for a fair, predictable, rules-based trading system. Paragraph 21 warns that tariffs, non-tariff restrictions and protectionist measures can disrupt trade and supply chains. Paragraph 22 condemns unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions that BRICS considers contrary to international law.

The declaration also recognises the position of smaller businesses. Paragraph 85 says that access to affordable finance remains a major obstacle to their participation in international trade. Yet when the declaration turns to cross-border payments, its language becomes more tentative. Paragraph 90 acknowledges studies of interoperability between national payment and financial-messaging channels, discusses settlement in BRICS currencies, and asks the BRICS Payment Task Force to continue its work.

That is the summit’s payment outcome: a commitment to develop practical solutions, not an announcement that a BRICS-wide trade-payment service is operating. The distinction matters most to the exporter who must decide whether to ship goods today.

Special arrangements exist. Who can use them?

China already operates the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) for renminbi cross-border payments. Russia and China conduct trade outside the dollar through participating banks. Reuters has also documented a more specialised Russia–China bank-netting arrangement used to keep selected transactions moving when ordinary banking routes face difficulty. Its reporting describes an arrangement directed principally at large companies, rather than a published banking service available to every trader. Reuters investigation

Even access to established renminbi channels does not guarantee prompt payment. In September 2025, a Nornickel executive reported that payments through Chinese banks could take up to four weeks because of banks’ concerns about sanctions. Nornickel is a major Russian metals exporter. Its experience does not prove that every Russia–China payment is delayed, but it shows why a smaller exporter cannot judge a payment route simply by the existence of CIPS or by the volume of bilateral trade. Reuters on Nornickel’s payment delays

Russia and Iran provide another test. They have linked their interbank financial-messaging systems, and Iranian authorities have reported that Russian banks are processing some Iranian letters of credit. Unlike the Mir–Shetab card connection for retail users, a letter of credit is directly relevant to financing a commercial shipment. But the available reports do not establish how many letters of credit have been completed, which banks and commodities qualify, or whether a smaller exporter can routinely obtain the service and receive its proceeds. Reuters on the banking link; report on letters of credit

Mir–Shetab nevertheless deserves attention as a payment model. Iran and Russia connected their domestic card networks so a traveller can use a participating card or mobile wallet across the border, while a merchant can accept payment through a participating terminal. An Iranian payment-service provider describes Iranian travellers making purchases and withdrawing roubles in Russia, and Russian visitors using Mir Pay at participating shops in Iran. This is a real example of national payment networks being made interoperable for cross-border use. Its present application is retail spending: a card purchase does not issue a letter of credit, finance cargo, settle a commercial freight invoice or establish how an exporter repatriates its earnings. Saman Kish Electronic Payment Company on Mir–Shetab

India has taken a different approach through a published rupee trade-settlement framework. It permits approved banks to use special rupee vostro accounts for eligible trade and addresses invoicing, payment and documentation, including arrangements for letters of credit. This is a concrete regulatory route. A particular exporter still needs banks on both sides willing to participate, sufficient funds for settlement and a practical use for the rupees received.

Iran and Venezuela offer a further example of efforts to establish dedicated banking channels amid U.S. sanctions, although Venezuela is not a BRICS member. The Iran–Venezuela Bi-National Bank, headquartered in Tehran, is one institution. Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, based in Caracas, is another, separate institution owned by Iran’s Export Development Bank. Their establishment shows an effort to create banking capacity for bilateral economic relations. It does not, by itself, establish that ordinary exporters have a reliable channel for financing shipments and receiving proceeds. The U.S. Treasury lists the Tehran bank and identified the Caracas bank separately.

These examples are evidence of progress, but they demonstrate different and limited things: an operating payment network, a special arrangement for selected transactions, a reported trade-finance service, a national regulatory framework and dedicated bilateral banks. None establishes that an exporter in any BRICS country can approach its usual bank and obtain the same dependable service for any eligible shipment.

The missing link is the willing bank

An exporter does not simply choose a currency and press “send.” The buyer may need credit. The exporter may need payment assurance before releasing cargo. Banks must handle the invoice and shipping documents, pay or receive the funds, and make the proceeds available in a usable currency. A freight company or insurer may also need payment along the way. If a bank refuses the transaction or holds it for weeks, the commercial chain can break even though a payment network is technically connected.

Secondary sanctions make bank participation especially difficult for trade involving Russia or Iran. The applicable restrictions depend on the parties, goods and transaction; not every shipment is prohibited. But foreign banks may consider their exposure to U.S. financial measures, including risks to correspondent banking, when deciding whether to handle a payment. Settling an invoice in yuan or roubles does not by itself remove those concerns. U.S. Treasury guidance

This is the practical gap between paragraph 22’s condemnation of sanctions, paragraph 85’s concern for smaller firms and paragraph 90’s discussion of future payment solutions. The declaration does not identify the banks that will serve ordinary traders, the commodities they will finance, the conditions under which they will issue letters of credit, or the time within which an exporter will receive payment.

For TFN, those are the measures of success. BRICS should report not only that systems are linked or that selected major buyers have completed non-dollar transactions, but whether ordinary importers and exporters can use a documented banking route. Participating banks, eligible commodities, currencies, charges, trade-finance terms, settlement times and procedures for rejected payments would make the claim testable. Completed transactions by smaller firms would show whether the route works beyond privileged or specially arranged trade.

TFN proposes that BRICS build on the models already in view. Mir–Shetab shows how two national payment networks can be connected and made usable by customers and merchants. Dedicated institutions such as the Tehran and Caracas banks show another approach: establish banks with an explicit bilateral purpose. For international trade, BRICS members could adapt these approaches through participating commercial banks that offer local-currency accounts, documented settlement routes, letters of credit and other trade-finance services to eligible businesses. The card-network model would need to be extended into commercial banking; the dedicated-bank model would need demonstrated correspondent access, liquidity, compliance capacity and a service that ordinary traders can actually obtain.

BRICS members have demonstrated that selected shipments can be paid for without dollars. The New Delhi Summit has not demonstrated that an ordinary exporter—particularly one trading with a sanctioned member—can reliably finance a shipment and receive the proceeds. Until that changes, the payment alternative exists in particular corridors and transactions, but not yet as a general facility for the businesses paragraph 85 says BRICS wants to support.