Export Resilience, Maritime Chokepoints, Alternative Corridors and the Economics of Energy Security

1. Executive Summary

For oil-producing countries, energy security is not simply a question of how much crude oil can be extracted. It is equally a question of whether that oil can be transported safely, economically and reliably to international markets. Production capacity creates potential export revenue; logistics determines how much of that potential can be realised when shipping routes are disrupted, ports become inaccessible, insurance premiums rise or regional conflicts threaten maritime traffic.

Global oil trade depends on a concentrated network of maritime chokepoints, export terminals, pipelines, storage facilities, refineries and tanker services. The Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca are particularly important because disruptions at these locations can affect trade well beyond the countries immediately involved.

The strategic challenge is especially acute for producers in the Persian Gulf. Many depend on maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz, while alternative pipelines and export terminals provide only partial protection. Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline provide important alternatives. Iran’s Jask terminal illustrates the potential value of developing export infrastructure outside Hormuz, although its sustainable operating capacity remains uncertain.

The International Energy Agency estimated that approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2025, representing around one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Its February 2026 factsheet also identified the limits of alternative export capacity and highlighted the exposure of regional liquefied natural gas exports. These are historical baseline figures, not measurements of actual traffic on the publication date. IEA, Strait of Hormuz.

Recent disruptions have demonstrated that alternative infrastructure is not merely a matter of constructing a pipeline. Its effectiveness depends on available throughput, terminal access, storage, tanker availability, security, insurance, commercial arrangements and the time required to activate additional capacity.

This paper examines global oil logistics from the perspective of producing and exporting countries. It assesses exposure to maritime chokepoints, compares existing and proposed alternative corridors, introduces a risk-ranking framework and considers the economics of investing in export resilience.

Its central argument is that export resilience must be designed into a country’s energy and trade strategy before a disruption occurs. A credible strategy combines diversified routes, strategically located storage, flexible port infrastructure, reliable shipping arrangements, regional cooperation and transparent contingency planning.

The objective is not to eliminate every risk, which would be economically unrealistic. It is to reduce the likelihood that a single disruption can interrupt a country’s principal source of export revenue, undermine production continuity or weaken its position in international markets.

2. Purpose and Scope

This paper considers oil logistics primarily from the perspective of oil-producing and oil-exporting countries. It focuses on the movement of crude oil and petroleum products from production areas to export terminals and international markets. It also considers liquefied natural gas (LNG) where maritime chokepoint exposure creates closely related energy-security risks.

The analysis addresses six questions:

• How dependent are major oil producers on specific maritime chokepoints?
• Which pipelines, ports and alternative corridors can reduce that dependence?
• What operational, commercial and geopolitical limitations constrain these alternatives?
• How should producing countries assess the cost of resilience against the cost of disruption?
• How can export risks be ranked consistently and translated into investment priorities?
• What practical measures can strengthen export continuity during short, prolonged and compound disruptions?

The paper distinguishes between established infrastructure, temporarily available capacity, announced expansion plans and proposed projects. These categories are not interchangeable. A pipeline’s nameplate capacity does not establish how much oil can be diverted immediately, and a proposed corridor does not constitute an operational alternative.

The assessment reflects information available as of 12 October 2026. It is a strategic policy analysis rather than a real-time operational bulletin.

3. Why Export Logistics Is a Strategic Issue for Oil Producers

Oil-producing countries traditionally assess performance through reserves, production volumes, lifting costs and export prices. These indicators remain fundamental, but they do not fully describe a country’s ability to earn revenue during a logistics crisis.

A producer may have substantial reserves and competitive extraction costs but still face severe commercial losses if it cannot move crude to buyers. Export interruptions can force production reductions, fill storage facilities, disrupt refinery supply chains and weaken fiscal revenues. Even where exports continue, longer voyages, higher insurance costs and limited tanker availability can reduce net returns.

Four dimensions determine export resilience.

Physical resilience is the ability to move oil through alternative pipelines, terminals, ports and maritime routes when the principal route becomes unavailable.

Operational resilience concerns the time and effort required to activate those alternatives. Infrastructure that exists but lacks pumping capacity, storage, suitable crude specifications or available tankers may provide less protection than its nominal capacity suggests.

Commercial resilience involves the availability of buyers, shipping contracts, insurance, financing and flexible delivery arrangements. A technically accessible export terminal is of limited value if cargoes cannot be insured, loaded or sold on commercially viable terms.

Strategic resilience concerns a country’s ability to preserve export continuity without becoming excessively dependent on one transit state, one maritime route or one foreign-controlled infrastructure asset.

These dimensions interact. A second pipeline may reduce physical dependence but create a new geopolitical dependency. Additional storage can provide time to respond, but it cannot replace an export route indefinitely. Diversified shipping destinations can improve commercial flexibility, but only if port infrastructure and tanker access are available.

The policy objective is not simply to maximise infrastructure capacity. It is to create a system in which a disruption can be absorbed, managed and reversed without disproportionate economic damage.

4. Global Maritime Chokepoints and Producer Exposure

4.1 Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. It is one of the world’s most consequential maritime chokepoints because major exporters, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, depend to varying degrees on Gulf shipping.

The IEA’s 2025 baseline indicates that approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products transited Hormuz. Much of this trade was destined for Asian markets. A prolonged disruption can affect tanker movements, cargo scheduling, marine insurance, oil prices and the availability of vessels.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operational crude-oil pipelines that provide alternative export directions. However, the IEA’s February 2026 assessment estimated that the available capacity to redirect crude through alternative routes was limited compared with the volume normally transiting the strait. The effective contribution of these alternatives depends on actual operating conditions, spare capacity and terminal availability.

Iran’s Jask terminal, located on the Gulf of Oman, provides another potential outlet. Reporting in 2026 documented renewed export activity, but sustainable throughput remains uncertain.

For Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Bahrain, the concentration of export infrastructure inside the Gulf creates substantial structural exposure. A closure or severe restriction of Hormuz could affect crude, petroleum products and, particularly in Qatar’s case, LNG exports.

The principal lesson is that a bypass route must be assessed on the basis of deliverable capacity, not its geographical position alone.

4.2 Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea

Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. It is a strategic gateway for vessels travelling between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Security threats in and around Yemen have demonstrated how instability near a narrow maritime passage can change commercial shipping decisions. Vessels may be diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing voyage distance, fuel consumption, transit time, vessel utilisation and insurance costs.

Saudi Arabia’s use of Yanbu as an alternative export terminal illustrates both the value and the limitations of shifting oil exports towards the Red Sea. The route can reduce dependence on Hormuz, but it creates exposure to Red Sea security conditions and the maritime approaches to Bab el-Mandeb.

For producers, the consequences depend on the location of export terminals and the destination of cargoes. Rerouting around Africa can preserve physical access to customers, but it is not a cost-neutral substitute.

4.3 Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline

The Suez Canal is a major link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. It shortens voyages between the Indian Ocean and Europe compared with the route around southern Africa.

The SUMED pipeline, which transports crude oil across Egypt between the Red Sea and Mediterranean regions, provides a complementary route for eligible flows.

Neither route removes the risks associated with regional instability. Canal disruptions, security concerns, operational constraints and changes in shipping risk can affect transit decisions and freight costs.

For oil producers, the practical question is whether cargoes can reach their intended markets through a viable alternative when the normal route becomes unreliable. The answer depends on crude grades, terminal compatibility, pipeline access, contractual arrangements and the availability of shipping capacity.

4.4 Strait of Malacca

The Strait of Malacca is a major maritime passage linking the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and East Asian markets. It is especially important for oil supplies moving towards China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian economies.

For Middle Eastern exporters, Malacca is primarily a destination-side transit chokepoint rather than an export outlet. A disruption can complicate access to Asian customers and change voyage planning, shipping costs and delivery schedules.

Alternative passages through the Indonesian archipelago may be available to suitable vessels. Their commercial attractiveness depends on vessel dimensions, navigation requirements, voyage distance and operating conditions.

The broader lesson is that oil-export resilience cannot be measured solely at the point of departure. A producer may successfully load a cargo but still face substantial delivery risk farther along the maritime chain.

5. Analytical Risk-Ranking Framework

Identifying vulnerable routes is not sufficient. Policymakers also need a consistent method to compare countries, identify critical dependencies and prioritise resilience investments.

This paper proposes a five-dimensional framework for evaluating the structural vulnerability of oil-export systems. It is a preliminary policy-screening tool, not a statistically validated probability model.

5.1 Risk Dimensions

1. Maritime chokepoint exposure — 30%

This measures the extent to which exports depend on a particular maritime passage or geographically concentrated export system. The assessment should explicitly consider export concentration: the proportion of a country’s exports dependent on its largest route, terminal or chokepoint.

2. Alternative export capacity — 25%

This assesses whether pipelines, alternative ports, terminals or other corridors can maintain meaningful export volumes when the principal route is unavailable. Installed capacity must be distinguished from usable spare capacity.

3. Operational readiness — 20%

This measures how quickly alternatives can be activated and whether they can operate reliably under crisis conditions. Relevant factors include infrastructure condition, pumping capability, storage availability, terminal compatibility, tanker access and emergency procedures.

4. Security and geopolitical exposure — 15%

This considers threats to pipelines, ports, loading terminals and maritime routes, together with risks arising from conflict, transit-country dependence, sanctions, political instability and restrictions on shipping or financial services.

5. Commercial and market flexibility — 10%

This assesses whether producers can redirect cargoes, access vessels and insurance, maintain viable contractual arrangements and deliver to alternative customers without excessive cost or delay.

5.2 Scoring Methodology

Each dimension receives a score from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating greater vulnerability.

• 1 — Very low risk: Limited exposure, robust alternatives and strong operational flexibility.
• 2 — Low risk: Manageable exposure with credible alternatives.
• 3 — Moderate risk: Material vulnerabilities exist, but alternatives provide partial protection.
• 4 — High risk: Significant dependence on concentrated infrastructure or exposed routes, with limited immediately usable alternatives.
• 5 — Very high risk: Severe concentration or weak alternatives, with a substantial risk that disruption could interrupt a large share of exports.

The weighted score is calculated as follows:

Overall Risk Score = (E × 0.30) + (A × 0.25) + (O × 0.20) + (G × 0.15) + (C × 0.10)

Where:

E = maritime exposure score A = alternative-capacity vulnerability score O = operational-readiness vulnerability score G = security and geopolitical vulnerability score C = commercial-flexibility vulnerability score

All five inputs use the same 1–5 scale, with higher scores representing greater risk. For alternative capacity, for example, a high score means usable alternatives are limited.

Indicative interpretation bands are:

• 1.00–1.79: Low risk
• 1.80–2.59: Moderate risk
• 2.60–3.39: Elevated risk
• 3.40–4.19: High risk
• 4.20–5.00: Very high risk

These thresholds are analytical conventions, not statistically validated probabilities of disruption. A score of 4.0 does not mean there is an 80% chance of an export interruption.

5.3 Preliminary Country Risk Assessment

A qualitative application of this framework suggests the following broad exposure categories. These categories are preliminary judgements based on structural characteristics, not calculated numerical scores.

Very high structural exposure: Iraq and Kuwait

Iraq’s heavy reliance on southern export infrastructure in the Persian Gulf creates substantial exposure to a disruption affecting Hormuz or Gulf loading facilities. Northern export routes cannot automatically replace southern volumes at scale. Alternative corridors remain constrained by infrastructure, transit arrangements and political and commercial considerations.

Kuwait’s principal crude export system is concentrated in the Persian Gulf, leaving it highly exposed to a prolonged disruption affecting maritime access through Hormuz. Practical alternatives to its principal export route are limited.

High structural exposure: Qatar, Bahrain and Iran

Qatar faces substantial exposure because its energy exports depend on maritime access from the Persian Gulf. LNG must be assessed separately from crude oil and petroleum products because liquefaction plants, specialised vessels and receiving terminals create distinct constraints.

Bahrain’s petroleum and refining-export arrangements are exposed to regional maritime disruption and the concentration of supporting infrastructure. Its smaller scale and particular supply-chain configuration require a separate assessment.

Iran faces significant maritime, infrastructure and commercial risks associated with Gulf export facilities, sanctions and restrictions affecting shipping, insurance and finance. Jask provides a potential outlet outside Hormuz, and reported 2026 loadings demonstrate that the terminal has been used. However, sustainable throughput and its ability to substitute for larger Gulf export volumes remain uncertain.

Elevated structural exposure with important alternatives: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

Saudi Arabia benefits from the East–West pipeline and Yanbu export terminal, which provide an alternative to Gulf export routes. However, resilience depends on actual pipeline throughput, terminal operations and Red Sea security. The announced target of up to 10 million barrels per day in pipeline-based export capacity is a future expansion objective, not current operating capacity.

The UAE benefits from ADCOP and access to Fujairah outside Hormuz. This provides a meaningful structural advantage, although the level of protection depends on confirmed spare capacity, terminal readiness and the security of the Gulf of Oman and wider regional maritime environment.

Different exposure profile: Russia, the United States, other Atlantic Basin producers and Oman

Russia has multiple export directions, but its risk profile is shaped by sanctions, security threats, transit dependencies, shipping restrictions and concentration in particular markets. Its exposure cannot be assessed solely through maritime chokepoints.

The United States and other Atlantic Basin producers generally have more diversified access to ports, pipelines and international markets, reducing direct dependence on Hormuz. Nevertheless, they remain exposed to global oil-price movements, freight costs, tanker availability and disruptions elsewhere in the international trading system.

Oman’s geography and ports outside Hormuz offer an advantageous position for its own maritime access and regional logistics. Its potential role as an alternative outlet for another producer depends on actual pipeline connections, access rights, terminal compatibility and commercial arrangements.

These categories should not be interpreted as a definitive league table. A quantified ranking requires comparable country-level data on export volumes by route, usable spare capacity, infrastructure activation times, storage coverage, security conditions and commercial constraints.

5.4 Structural Risk versus Immediate Operational Risk

Structural risk concerns a country’s underlying dependence on concentrated routes and infrastructure. It changes relatively slowly as pipelines, terminals, storage and commercial arrangements are developed.

Immediate operational risk concerns conditions at a particular time. It can change rapidly following a security incident, pipeline outage, port closure, tanker shortage, insurance restriction or change in maritime access.

A country with high structural exposure may continue exporting normally while its principal route remains open. Conversely, a country with comparatively strong infrastructure diversification may experience a severe interruption if several routes are disrupted simultaneously.

The framework should therefore be updated through two complementary assessments:

• Structural resilience assessment: Conducted periodically and whenever major infrastructure or commercial arrangements change.
• Operational disruption assessment: Updated when security conditions, infrastructure availability, shipping access or export flows change materially.

The two assessments should not be combined without explanation. A structural ranking is not a real-time forecast of which country will experience the next disruption.

5.5 From Risk Ranking to Investment Priorities

Risk scores should guide investigation and investment, not determine spending automatically.

For high-risk producers, the first priority is to identify the largest source of potential export loss. In some cases, an additional pipeline or terminal may be justified. In others, improved storage, protection of critical infrastructure, pumping upgrades, emergency repairs or flexible shipping contracts may offer better value.

Each investment should be assessed for its expected reduction in export losses, implementation time, capital and operating costs, and residual risk. An alternative route that depends on another exposed maritime passage may transfer rather than eliminate vulnerability.

Where data are unavailable, the uncertainty should be recorded explicitly rather than replaced with assumed precision.

6. Producer-by-Producer Assessment

6.1 Saudi Arabia: The East–West Pipeline and Red Sea Exposure

Saudi Arabia has one of the most significant pipeline-based alternatives to Hormuz. Its East–West pipeline, commonly known as Petroline, transports crude from the eastern production region towards the Red Sea port of Yanbu.

The pipeline allows Saudi Arabia to redirect some exports away from the Persian Gulf. Its value depends on actual throughput, pumping-station availability, terminal capacity and the security of the Red Sea route.

Reuters reported on 29 September 2026 that Yanbu oil loading had resumed following the pipeline’s restart after a disruption. The resumption of loadings should not be confused with an immediate return to full sustainable capacity. Reuters, 29 September 2026.

On 12 October 2026, Saudi Arabia announced plans to increase pipeline-based oil export capacity to as much as 10 million barrels per day over the next two to three years. The plan includes temporary conversion of a domestic gas pipeline for crude transport and further investment in the East–West system. The 10 million barrels per day figure is a future target, not current available capacity. Reuters, 12 October 2026.

Saudi Arabia’s experience highlights two risks. First, a pipeline bypassing Hormuz can itself be disrupted. Second, shifting exports towards the Red Sea transfers some exposure from the Gulf to another maritime environment affected by security risks and elevated insurance costs.

A resilient Saudi export strategy therefore requires pipeline expansion, protection of pumping infrastructure, sufficient storage, flexible terminal operations and continued assessment of Red Sea shipping conditions.

6.2 United Arab Emirates: Fujairah and ADCOP

The UAE has an important geographic advantage through Fujairah, located on the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz. The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, commonly known as ADCOP, connects inland production areas with the Fujairah export terminal.

The route provides a means of moving eligible Abu Dhabi crude to tankers without requiring those cargoes to pass through Hormuz. Fujairah’s wider energy infrastructure, including storage and petroleum-product facilities, further strengthens its importance.

However, the presence of a bypass does not establish that all UAE exports can be diverted immediately. Effective capacity depends on pipeline operating conditions, crude allocation, terminal availability, storage, loading schedules and the degree to which facilities are already committed.

The UAE should distinguish between installed capacity, actual throughput and spare capacity that can be activated during a crisis. Public estimates of available bypass capacity should be supported by current operational evidence rather than inferred from nameplate ratings.

6.3 Iraq: High Exposure and Limited Export Flexibility

Iraq’s principal southern crude exports depend heavily on infrastructure in the northern Persian Gulf. Production and export continuity are therefore vulnerable to disruption in maritime access, terminal operations and regional security.

Northern export arrangements provide a different geographical direction, but they cannot automatically replace the scale of southern exports. Pipeline access, transit agreements, production compatibility, infrastructure condition and relations with neighbouring jurisdictions all affect the feasibility of alternatives.

Proposals to establish or revive a Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline connecting Iraq with the Syrian Mediterranean coast have attracted renewed attention. Such a route could offer long-term diversification if commercially viable, technically feasible and supported by durable cross-border agreements.

It must nevertheless be treated as a proposed corridor rather than an operational alternative. Financing, security, infrastructure reconstruction, transit rights, commercial governance and the distribution of costs and benefits would need to be resolved before it could provide reliable export capacity.

For Iraq, resilience requires protection of southern terminals, additional storage, pipeline rehabilitation where viable, diversification of export directions and practical contingency arrangements with neighbouring countries.

6.4 Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain: Shared Regional Exposure

Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain have different production profiles and export arrangements, but their principal oil and energy export systems are closely connected to the Persian Gulf.

Kuwait’s crude exports depend heavily on maritime access from Gulf terminals. Qatar’s energy economy is dominated by natural gas and LNG alongside petroleum and related products. Bahrain’s refinery and petroleum-export system also relies on regional infrastructure and maritime access.

For all three, priorities include protected loading facilities, adequate storage, reliable shipping arrangements, emergency coordination and a realistic assessment of what can be rerouted if Hormuz becomes difficult or impossible to use.

Shared regional infrastructure may offer opportunities, but it also creates interdependence. Countries must establish in advance who receives scarce capacity, who pays for emergency operations and how competing claims are resolved.

6.5 Iran: Kharg Island, Jask and Commercial Constraints

Iran’s oil export logistics have historically depended heavily on Kharg Island and other facilities in the Persian Gulf. This concentration creates exposure to maritime restrictions, sanctions, security threats and interruptions affecting the Gulf.

The Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman was developed to provide an export outlet outside Hormuz. Its associated pipeline is intended to move crude from the Goreh area towards Jask, where offshore loading infrastructure can transfer cargoes to tankers.

S&P Global reported in August 2026 that satellite imagery showed tanker activity and repeated crude loadings at Jask between March and July. The terminal’s initial single-point mooring was designed for a loading capacity of up to 1 million barrels per day, but that design figure does not establish that the terminal can sustain that export rate under current conditions. S&P Global, 5 August 2026.

Iran’s wider export resilience is also affected by sanctions, shipping restrictions, access to insurance and finance, and complex trading and shipping arrangements. Physical infrastructure is only one component of the problem.

The strategic lesson is that a bypass terminal is most valuable when it can operate predictably, load commercially meaningful volumes, obtain access to tankers and maintain a viable route to buyers.

6.6 Russia: Multiple Export Directions, Different Constraints

Russia has several export directions, including Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific and pipeline-linked routes. This geographic spread can provide flexibility, but it does not eliminate exposure to sanctions, security incidents, shipping restrictions, price discounts, insurance constraints or the policies of transit countries.

Different export routes serve different markets and are not necessarily interchangeable. A Pacific terminal may serve Asian customers but cannot automatically replace a disrupted Baltic or Black Sea shipment without additional transport, scheduling and commercial adjustments.

Russia’s experience demonstrates that diversification must be assessed across the complete export chain: production field, gathering system, pipeline or rail access, terminal, vessel, maritime route, buyer and payment mechanism. A country may possess multiple ports but remain concentrated in financing, insurance or destination markets.

6.7 United States and Atlantic Basin Producers

The United States and other Atlantic Basin producers have access to a broad network of ports, pipelines, storage facilities and destination markets. This can reduce dependence on any single Gulf chokepoint for their own exports.

However, geographic diversification does not insulate these producers from global price effects. A disruption in the Middle East can increase benchmark prices, freight costs, tanker demand and insurance premiums, while changing the relative attractiveness of crude grades in different regions.

The wider lesson is that even producers with less direct exposure to a particular chokepoint remain connected to the global oil market through prices, freight and refinery demand.

6.8 Oman: A Strategic Location, Not an Automatic Regional Bypass

Oman’s ports and coastal geography outside Hormuz provide an important position in regional maritime logistics. Its ports can support energy trade, bunkering, storage and other services, subject to facility-specific capabilities and commercial arrangements.

However, an export terminal outside Hormuz does not automatically become an alternative outlet for another country’s crude. Such a role requires a viable connection from the production area, transport capacity, access rights, compatible storage and loading systems, and agreements governing ownership, fees, security and allocation.

Oman can be an important partner in regional logistics diversification, but its potential should be assessed through specific infrastructure and commercial proposals rather than geographic proximity alone.

7. LNG Logistics: A Distinct Energy-Security Challenge

Crude oil and LNG share exposure to maritime chokepoints, but their logistics systems are fundamentally different. Crude oil can sometimes be redirected through pipelines to alternative terminals. LNG depends on liquefaction plants, specialised carriers, loading facilities and receiving terminals equipped to handle the cargo.

The IEA’s February 2026 factsheet estimated that approximately 93% of Qatar’s LNG exports and 96% of the UAE’s LNG exports transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2025. Together, Qatar and the UAE accounted for almost one-fifth of global LNG trade passing through the strait. These are dated baseline figures, not real-time export measurements.

Unlike crude oil, LNG from these countries cannot simply be transferred to an alternative export terminal through an ordinary oil pipeline. The liquefaction and loading infrastructure is highly specialised, and there is no equivalent operational bypass capable of redirecting the majority of these LNG exports to global markets.

The consequences of disruption therefore extend beyond the producing countries. Importers may face shortages, higher spot prices, increased competition for flexible cargoes and pressure on domestic power generation and industrial supply.

LNG resilience requires a separate assessment of:

• Exposure of liquefaction plants and loading terminals.
• Maritime access and availability of LNG carriers.
• Alternative receiving markets and contractual flexibility.
• Storage and regasification capacity in importing countries.
• The availability of substitute pipeline gas or other fuels.
• The economic consequences of prolonged interruptions.

For Qatar and the UAE, the primary concern is not simply whether vessels can be rerouted. It is whether the complete chain from gas production to liquefaction, loading, maritime transport and final delivery remains operational.

For importing countries, LNG security also depends on diversification of suppliers, access to flexible cargoes, storage where available, interconnection with neighbouring markets and the ability to manage temporary reductions in gas supply.

The broader policy lesson is that oil and LNG should be included in an integrated energy-security strategy but evaluated through distinct operational risk models.

8. Alternative Corridors: Operational Reality and Future Options

Alternative corridors are often discussed as if a new pipeline or port can immediately solve a country’s exposure to a maritime chokepoint. In practice, every alternative must be evaluated across its full operating chain.

8.1 Existing Pipelines and Export Terminals

Existing infrastructure generally offers the fastest potential response to a disruption, provided spare capacity is available and the route remains secure.

Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the UAE’s ADCOP demonstrate how pipelines can redirect eligible crude to terminals outside Hormuz. Their effectiveness nevertheless depends on the volume that can be moved, the time required to increase throughput, terminal availability and the security of the destination coast.

A pipeline with little unused capacity may provide valuable routine export access but limited additional capacity during a crisis. Conversely, nominal spare capacity may not be deliverable if downstream terminals, storage or tankers become bottlenecks.

8.2 New Cross-Border Pipelines

Proposals for additional pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula or towards Mediterranean export terminals could diversify export directions.

However, cross-border pipelines require substantial capital, stable transit arrangements, security guarantees and agreement on tariffs, ownership, capacity allocation and dispute resolution. Their economics depend on expected throughput over many years, not merely their value during an exceptional crisis.

Projects such as the proposed Kirkuk–Baniyas route should therefore be evaluated through feasibility studies, independent demand assessments, technical surveys, financing plans and binding agreements among participating jurisdictions.

8.3 Storage and Strategic Inventories

Storage can be one of the most effective near-term resilience measures. It allows producers to maintain loading schedules during temporary interruptions, smooth fluctuations in pipeline flows and allow time for repairs or alternative shipping arrangements.

However, storage provides a buffer rather than a permanent substitute for exports. Once available capacity is filled, production may have to be reduced if the export route remains unavailable.

Storage strategy should therefore be integrated with production flexibility, refinery demand, terminal throughput, pipeline capacity and emergency export plans.

8.4 Alternative Maritime Routes

When a chokepoint becomes unsafe or commercially unattractive, vessels may be rerouted through alternative passages. The Cape of Good Hope, for example, can provide an alternative to routes through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

The cost of rerouting includes additional sailing days, fuel, crew time, vessel utilisation and potentially higher insurance costs. Longer voyages can reduce the number of cargoes a tanker can complete within a given period, tightening vessel availability across the market.

Alternative maritime routes should be treated as contingency options, not cost-neutral substitutes. Their suitability depends on the cargo’s destination, vessel characteristics, market timing and the severity and expected duration of the disruption.

8.5 Regional Logistics Cooperation

Regional cooperation can improve resilience where countries share access to pipelines, ports, storage, shipping services or emergency infrastructure.

Participating countries need clear operating rules, access conditions, tariffs, technical standards, security protocols, capacity-allocation mechanisms and arrangements for resolving disputes.

Commercial users also need confidence that emergency access will be honoured when capacity is scarce. Transparent rules established before a crisis are more likely to support reliable cooperation than improvised agreements made after a disruption has begun.

8.6 Evaluating a Corridor

Before investing in a new route, a producer should ask four questions:

Can it move meaningful volumes? Nameplate capacity must be distinguished from sustainable throughput and usable spare capacity.

How quickly can it be activated? A route requiring years of construction is not an immediate contingency.

What is the full delivered cost? Pipeline tariffs, terminal fees, storage, shipping, insurance, financing and transit charges all affect netbacks.

What new dependencies does it create? An alternative route may reduce dependence on one chokepoint while increasing reliance on a transit country, a single terminal or another exposed maritime passage.

The best corridor is not necessarily the shortest or cheapest in normal conditions. It is the one whose total commercial value, reliability and crisis performance justify its cost.

9. The Economics of Resilient Oil Logistics

Resilience has a cost. Additional pipelines, storage facilities, terminals, security systems and alternative shipping arrangements require capital and operating expenditure. In normal market conditions, infrastructure designed primarily for emergencies may appear underutilised.

However, the economic value of resilience cannot be measured only by routine utilisation. It must also account for the losses avoided when a disruption occurs.

For an oil producer, the financial consequences of an export interruption can include lost or deferred export revenue, production shut-ins, additional storage and handling expenses, higher freight and marine insurance premiums, contractual penalties, reduced government revenue and damage to long-term commercial relationships.

9.1 Net Resilience Benefit

A practical economic test is:

Net resilience benefit = Expected losses avoided during disruptions − Annualised cost of the resilience investment.

The assessment should consider the probability and duration of disruption, the volume of exports protected, the additional cost per barrel through the alternative route and the time required to activate it.

This is a decision framework, not a claim that all relevant risks can be predicted precisely. The probability of a geopolitical disruption may be difficult to estimate, so investment decisions should also be tested against alternative scenarios.

A project may be justified even if it appears expensive under normal conditions, provided it prevents sufficiently large losses in credible disruption scenarios. Conversely, a strategically attractive corridor may not be justified if its costs are excessive or it cannot provide meaningful export capacity when needed.

9.2 Route Selection and Export Netbacks

A producer’s netback is the value remaining from a sale after relevant transport, handling and other costs are deducted. Different routes can generate different netbacks because of variations in freight, terminal charges, insurance, transit fees, crude quality and delivery terms.

A longer route may still be commercially preferable if it avoids severe disruption risk or offers more reliable access to a high-value market. Conversely, an alternative route may be physically available but uneconomic for a particular crude grade or destination.

Route selection should therefore compare delivered economics under both normal and stressed conditions.

9.3 The Value of Spare Capacity

Spare capacity has strategic value even when it is not continuously used. It can provide an outlet during disruption, accommodate temporary increases in production and improve bargaining flexibility with transport providers.

But spare capacity should be verified rather than assumed. A pipeline may be technically capable of moving a given volume while the terminal, storage facilities or tanker market cannot support the same throughput.

Producers should maintain a current inventory of usable spare capacity across the entire export chain. This inventory should identify the limiting component, the time needed to activate additional flows and the commercial arrangements required to do so.

9.4 Sharing the Cost of Resilience

Exporting countries may bear much of the direct cost of alternative pipelines and terminals, while importing countries also benefit from a more reliable global supply.

This creates a potential case for long-term capacity reservations, take-or-pay contracts, strategic stock arrangements, joint infrastructure investment or other commercial mechanisms that distribute costs among beneficiaries.

Such arrangements must specify who owns the infrastructure, who pays for unused capacity, how emergency access is allocated and what happens when the route itself becomes unavailable.

The goal should be commercially sustainable resilience rather than infrastructure built without a credible plan for financing, use and maintenance.

10. Stress-Testing Export Resilience

Risk rankings identify structural vulnerability, but they do not establish how a country would perform during a specific disruption. Stress testing translates the assessment into practical planning.

Three illustrative scenarios can provide a common basis for evaluating the ability to maintain exports. The durations below are analytical assumptions, not forecasts.

Scenario A: Short Interruption — 7 Days

This scenario examines a temporary interruption affecting the principal export route.

The assessment should determine whether available storage, tanker scheduling, flexible loading windows and emergency arrangements can maintain normal production and minimise delivery delays.

Key questions include how much oil can be stored, how quickly cargoes can be rescheduled and whether the interruption would trigger contractual or operational problems.

Scenario B: Prolonged Disruption — 30 Days

This scenario examines a more sustained interruption that requires alternative export arrangements.

The assessment should estimate how much export volume can be redirected through available pipelines and terminals, how quickly those routes can be activated and whether storage constraints would force production reductions.

It should also examine additional freight and insurance costs, contractual exposure, lost or deferred revenue and the implications for government finances.

Scenario C: Compound Disruption — 90 Days

This scenario examines simultaneous disruption of the principal route and its main alternative.

Such a scenario may arise from multiple infrastructure failures, a wider regional conflict or a combination of maritime restrictions and damage to export facilities.

The assessment should consider whether the country can maintain any meaningful export flow, how long production can continue before storage becomes exhausted, and which emergency measures are available to protect economic stability.

It should also examine the consequences for customers, domestic refining, government revenue and foreign-exchange earnings.

10.1 Using the Results

For each scenario, policymakers should estimate:

• The volume of exports that can be sustained.
• The time required to activate alternative routes.
• The additional cost per barrel.
• The amount of production likely to be curtailed.
• The resulting loss or deferral of export revenue.
• The time required to restore normal operations.

These results should be used to compare investments in pipelines, storage, terminal upgrades, infrastructure protection and commercial contingency arrangements.

A route that performs well during a seven-day interruption may prove inadequate over 30 or 90 days. Stress testing therefore helps identify whether a country has a temporary buffer or a genuinely resilient export system.

11. Strategic Priorities and Implementation Roadmap

Oil-producing countries should adopt a phased approach to strengthening export resilience.

Immediate Priorities: 0–12 Months

The first priority is to understand existing exposure and improve operational readiness.

Governments and national oil companies should map the export chain from production fields to international buyers, verify available pipeline and terminal capacity, review storage levels and identify critical infrastructure dependencies.

They should also examine shipping and insurance arrangements, establish disruption scenarios and identify the contractual steps required to redirect cargoes.

The immediate output should be a national export-resilience assessment and a prioritised list of operational improvements.

Medium-Term Priorities: 1–3 Years

The second phase should focus on measures that can improve resilience without requiring entirely new corridors.

Potential actions include improving the reliability of existing pipelines, upgrading pumping stations, improving terminal operations, expanding strategically located storage and strengthening emergency repair arrangements.

Countries should also develop regional cooperation agreements and conduct exercises to test whether alternative routes can be activated within the required time.

Long-Term Priorities: 3–10 Years

Longer-term investment should focus on infrastructure that offers demonstrable economic and strategic benefits.

Depending on national circumstances, this may include additional pipelines, new export terminals, expanded storage, alternative port connections or cross-border infrastructure.

Each project should be evaluated against realistic demand, financing, throughput, security and environmental assumptions. Investments should be prioritised according to the amount of meaningful export capacity they can preserve during a disruption and the total cost of providing that resilience.

The timeline is indicative. Major pipelines and cross-border corridors may require longer than ten years, depending on engineering, financing, approvals and security conditions.

12. Policy Recommendations

First, prepare a national oil-export resilience assessment. Identify principal export routes, critical infrastructure, available spare capacity and exposure to maritime chokepoints. Distinguish installed capacity from usable capacity and identify how quickly alternatives could be activated.

Second, establish an export-routing contingency plan. Identify alternative terminals, pipeline connections, storage locations, shipping options, contractual requirements and responsible agencies. Test the plan periodically through operational exercises.

Third, prioritise bottlenecks before building new infrastructure. Additional pumping capacity, terminal improvements, storage, maintenance or better scheduling may deliver greater resilience at lower cost than a major new corridor.

Fourth, evaluate new corridors through independent feasibility studies. Assess technical, commercial, environmental, financial and geopolitical viability. Examine expected throughput, operating costs, security risks, transit rights, demand assumptions and competing routes.

Fifth, establish regional infrastructure and emergency-access agreements. Negotiate transparent rules for access, tariffs, capacity allocation, security and dispute resolution. Emergency access should be supported by credible contractual arrangements rather than relying exclusively on political assurances.

Sixth, protect critical infrastructure and improve recovery capability. Identify vulnerable pipelines, pumping stations, storage facilities, control systems and loading terminals. Establish emergency communications, repair arrangements and procedures for restoring operations.

Seventh, incorporate logistics resilience into national energy strategy. Investment decisions should account for the cost of disruption as well as the cost of infrastructure. Compare the economic value of spare capacity, storage, alternative routes and operational preparedness on a consistent basis.

Eighth, assess LNG separately from oil. Countries dependent on LNG exports or imports should evaluate specialised infrastructure, maritime access, receiving-terminal capacity and alternative fuel arrangements through a dedicated risk model.

Ninth, maintain an evidence-based risk register. Update route exposure, usable spare capacity, operational readiness and commercial constraints regularly. Record data gaps explicitly and avoid presenting preliminary qualitative judgements as validated numerical rankings.

13. Implications for Importers and Regional Connectivity

Although this paper focuses on producing countries, export resilience has direct consequences for importing economies. A disruption can raise crude prices, freight rates and insurance premiums while increasing uncertainty over delivery schedules.

For Pakistan, the relevant lessons concern diversification of supply sources, adequate storage, port and terminal resilience, shipping arrangements and the ability to absorb short-term disruptions. The issue is not simply whether crude is available in the international market, but whether it can be delivered at a manageable cost and within the required time.

Regional connectivity can also influence the economics of energy security. Pipelines, ports, inland transport and storage facilities may support wider trade and industrial activity when planned around credible demand and reliable operating arrangements.

However, regional corridors should not be presented as immediate substitutes for maritime oil exports unless their capacity, technical feasibility, transit rights and commercial arrangements have been established. Infrastructure planning must distinguish between a strategic possibility and a route that can actually carry cargo.

For both exporters and importers, the objective is to reduce exposure to single points of failure while preserving commercially viable access to global markets.

14. Conclusion

The global oil trade depends on a complex logistics system whose strategic importance becomes most visible when normal routes are disrupted. For oil-producing countries, access to markets is not guaranteed by reserves or production capacity alone. It depends on the reliability of pipelines, ports, storage, tankers, maritime passages, commercial arrangements and transit relationships.

The experience of producers in the Persian Gulf illustrates the importance of alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the UAE’s ADCOP provide established means of reducing exposure. Iran’s Jask terminal demonstrates the potential of export infrastructure outside the strait, while also showing why actual operating performance must be distinguished from design capacity. Iraq’s search for additional export routes illustrates the technical, financial and political challenges of developing new corridors.

LNG adds a distinct dimension to energy security because specialised liquefaction, shipping and receiving infrastructure cannot be substituted as easily as some crude-oil transport arrangements. Producers and importers must therefore evaluate oil and gas logistics together at the strategic level while maintaining separate operational assessments.

The proposed risk-ranking framework and disruption scenarios provide a structured method for comparing vulnerabilities and identifying where resilience investments may deliver the greatest benefit. Their value depends on transparent assumptions, current data and a clear distinction between structural exposure and immediate operational conditions.

Resilience requires investment, but it also requires better planning, reliable information, effective contracts, infrastructure protection and cooperation among neighbouring countries and commercial operators.

The strategic objective for oil-producing countries should be clear: ensure that no single pipeline, terminal, maritime chokepoint or transit dependency can unnecessarily place the country’s export revenues at risk.

Achieving this objective does not require eliminating every vulnerability. It requires understanding where vulnerabilities lie, determining which alternatives are genuinely available and investing in the combination of infrastructure and preparedness that offers the greatest economic protection.

15. Source Status and Verification Note

This paper reflects information available as of 12 October 2026. It is intended as a strategic policy analysis rather than a real-time operational report.

Published infrastructure capacities may differ from actual throughput and usable spare capacity. Announced expansion plans are not equivalent to completed projects, and proposed corridors should not be treated as operational routes. Estimates of oil flows and export volumes may also vary according to reporting periods, cargo definitions and data sources.

The country risk categories in this paper are preliminary qualitative assessments. They are not statistically validated rankings or predictions of the probability of disruption. A numerical ranking should be published only when comparable country-level evidence is available.

Before making investment, procurement, shipping or government-policy decisions, readers should verify the latest operational information with the relevant authorities, infrastructure operators and primary sources.

16. References and Further Reading

1. International Energy Agency (IEA). Strait of Hormuz: Oil Security and Emergency Response. February 2026 factsheet. https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz
2. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). World Oil Transit Chokepoints. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints
3. Reuters, 29 September 2026. Saudi resumes Yanbu oil loading after pipeline restart. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-resumes-yanbu-oil-loading-after-pipeline-restart-2026-09-29/
4. Reuters, 5 October 2026. Oil’s new problem isn’t supply. It’s logistics. https://www.reuters.com/commentary/reuters-open-interest/oils-new-problem-isnt-supply-its-logistics-2026-10-05/
5. Reuters, 6 October 2026. Just-in-time to just-in-case: oil executives say world needs more export routes. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/just-in-time-just-in-case-oil-executives-say-world-needs-more-export-routes-2026-10-06/
6. Reuters, 12 October 2026. Saudi Arabia eyes raising its pipeline oil export capacity to 10 million bpd, energy minister says. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-eyes-raising-its-pipeline-oil-export-capacity-10-million-bpd-energy-2026-10-12/
7. S&P Global Energy, 5 August 2026. Iran turns to crude exports via Jask terminal amid Hormuz disruptions. https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/080526-iran-turns-to-crude-exports-via-jask-terminal-amid-hormuz-disruptions
8. Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 1 October 2026. Red Sea Brief – 1 October 2026. https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/red-sea-brief-1-october-2026
9. Reuters, 9 October 2026. Reporting on the proposed Kirkuk–Baniyas oil pipeline and related investment and governance concerns. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-envoy-kept-financial-ties-firm-behind-15-billion-hormuz-bypass-oil-2026-10-09/
10. Reuters, 12 October 2026. The oil market’s center of gravity is moving east. https://www.reuters.com/commentary/reuters-open-interest/oil-markets-center-gravity-is-moving-east-2026-10-12/