TFN Research & Policy Analysis

Uzbekistan’s freight traffic with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation reached approximately 33.5 million tonnes in 2025, around 40 percent—or about 9 million tonnes—higher than five years earlier.

The headline is significant. But the more important story lies behind the number.

Uzbekistan is one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world. Every shipment seeking access to a seaport must cross at least two international borders. Geography should therefore impose a substantial structural disadvantage on its international logistics.

Yet Uzbekistan is increasingly turning that disadvantage into a multi-corridor trade and transit strategy.

It is maintaining its established northern connections with Kazakhstan and Russia, strengthening its eastern connection with China, developing access through the Middle Corridor, maintaining routes through Turkmenistan and Iran, and pursuing southern connectivity through Afghanistan toward both Iran and Pakistan.

The evidence suggests a wider lesson for international trade facilitation:

Geography determines where a country is located. Policy determines how effectively it is connected.

Freight Growth Provides the Economic Base

Uzbekistan’s freight economy has expanded steadily.

Official statistics show total freight transportation increasing from approximately 1.367 billion tonnes in 2020 to 1.420 billion tonnes in 2021 and 2022, 1.456 billion tonnes in 2023, 1.535 billion tonnes in 2024 and 1.610 billion tonnes in 2025.

That represents an increase of approximately 243 million tonnes, or 17.8 percent, in five years.

But transit has grown considerably faster.

Uzbekistan reported 15.3 million tonnes of transit freight in 2025, approximately 54 percent higher than in 2021.

Working backwards from that official growth rate gives an estimated 2021 transit volume of approximately 9.9 million tonnes.

Uzbekistan therefore added roughly 5.4 million tonnes of annual transit traffic in only four years.

This distinction is important.

Uzbekistan is not simply moving more cargo because its domestic economy is expanding. It is increasing its participation in international cargo flows crossing its territory.

The 33.5 Million-Tonne SCO Signal

The reported 33.5 million tonnes of freight with SCO countries provides another indication of the depth of Uzbekistan’s regional integration.

Russia accounted for approximately 33 percent, equivalent to roughly 11.1 million tonnes.

Kazakhstan represented another 32 percent, or approximately 10.7 million tonnes.

China accounted for around 16 percent, approximately 5.4 million tonnes, while Kyrgyzstan represented about 10 percent, or roughly 3.4 million tonnes.

Russia and Kazakhstan therefore accounted for approximately 65 percent of Uzbekistan’s reported SCO freight traffic.

This demonstrates that the traditional northern transport system remains fundamental to Uzbekistan.

The country’s strategy is not to abandon established corridors.

It is to add alternatives to them.

Transit Is Being Developed as an Industry

Uzbekistan does not regard the present 15.3 million tonnes of transit traffic as the limit of its potential.

In July 2026, the Uzbek government stated that the country currently captures only around 1–2 percent of the transit market it considers potentially accessible.

Its objective is to attract another:

15–20 million tonnes of international transit freight annually.

If achieved, Uzbekistan could approach or exceed 30 million tonnes of annual transit traffic.

More revealing than the tonnage target is how the government values that traffic.

Uzbek authorities estimate that an additional 15–20 million tonnes could generate approximately $400–600 million in additional annual revenue, stimulate around $3 billion of investment in logistics centres, and support approximately 50,000 jobs.

These are government projections rather than achieved results. They should therefore be treated as targets, not forecasts.

Nevertheless, they reveal an important policy philosophy.

Uzbekistan treats transit as an economic industry rather than merely a Customs procedure.

Transit generates trucking and railway revenue, terminals, warehousing, freight forwarding, insurance, container handling, maintenance, employment, investment and foreign exchange.

Infrastructure Means More Than Roads and Railways

Uzbekistan has approximately 4,700 kilometres of railway network and around 4,000 kilometres of international transit corridors.

But its transport policy increasingly extends beyond physical infrastructure.

The country has developed 27 logistics centres meeting international requirements, with combined handling capacity of approximately 27.2 million tonnes.

At the same time, the government openly acknowledges major gaps.

Only one logistics centre is classified in the highest category.

Modern automated Class-A warehousing currently satisfies only around 10–15 percent of demand.

Refrigerated and Customs warehousing remains insufficient. Containerisation needs expansion. Logistics facilities are heavily concentrated around major centres, while public and private logistics information systems require greater integration.

This is an important feature of Uzbekistan’s approach.

A trade corridor is increasingly being treated as an integrated system:

Transport + Customs + border management + logistics centres + warehousing + containers + digital information + transit guarantees + international agreements.

That distinction matters.

A road provides physical connectivity.

A functioning logistics system converts that connectivity into trade.

Border Reform Is Producing Measurable Results

CAREC’s Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring data provide useful evidence of how Uzbekistan’s trade-facilitation reforms are translating into operational performance.

Average road-border clearance time declined from approximately 7.6 hours in 2021 to 4.2 hours in 2022 and stood at 4.7 hours in 2023.

Average border-clearance cost declined from approximately $92 in 2021 to $74 in 2022 and $50 in 2023.

The standard CAREC road-transport cost for a 20-tonne shipment over 500 kilometres declined from approximately $674 in 2021 to $568 in 2023.

At the same time, effective corridor speed—including delays—increased from approximately 27.9 km/h to 33.2 km/h.

Speed excluding delays reached approximately 47.4 km/h in 2023.

These are not abstract reform indicators.

They represent lower time, lower border cost and greater utilisation of transport equipment.

This is trade facilitation becoming measurable logistics productivity.

The Central Policy: Never Depend on One Corridor

For a double-landlocked economy, dependence on a single transit route is itself an economic risk.

Uzbekistan’s response has been diversification.

North: Kazakhstan and Russia

The northern system remains Uzbekistan’s largest established freight connection.

The SCO data demonstrate its continuing importance: Russia and Kazakhstan together account for around two-thirds of Uzbekistan’s reported SCO freight traffic.

These routes remain commercially and historically important and connect Uzbekistan with the broader Eurasian railway system.

East: Kyrgyzstan and China

China is increasingly important to Uzbekistan’s trade structure.

Uzbekistan imported approximately $14.8 billion of goods from China in 2025, making China its largest source of imports.

The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway therefore represents much more than a geopolitical infrastructure project.

Its proposed alignment from Kashgar through Kyrgyzstan toward Andijan would provide Uzbekistan with a more direct railway connection to its largest supplier.

Official projections envisage eventual capacity of up to 15 million tonnes annually. This remains projected capacity rather than existing traffic.

But its strategic importance extends beyond bilateral China–Uzbekistan trade.

It potentially creates a new eastern inlet into Uzbekistan’s expanding Eurasian transport network.

West: The Middle Corridor

The Trans-Caspian or Middle Corridor provides another strategic outlet.

Uzbek cargo can move through Central Asian networks toward the Caspian Sea and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye toward European markets.

The corridor contains its own structural challenges: multiple borders, rail-sea transfers, port interfaces, ferry capacity and coordination between several transport systems.

Nevertheless, it provides something extremely valuable to a landlocked economy:

an alternative.

The value of that alternative increases whenever northern or southern routes face geopolitical or operational disruption.

Uzbekistan is therefore expanding electronic permits, digital cargo information and international data exchange associated with these transport systems.

Southwest: Turkmenistan and Iran

The established route through Turkmenistan and Iran to Bandar Abbas remains an important maritime outlet.

The working road distance from Tashkent to Bandar Abbas used in our research is approximately 2,827 kilometres.

It is therefore geographically attractive.

But distance alone does not determine logistics competitiveness.

Transit through Turkmenistan has historically involved foreign-carrier permits, driver visas, charges and administrative controls. These arrangements are improving, including through digital permits and eTIR developments, but they remain relevant to corridor economics.

Iran introduces a different consideration.

Its transport infrastructure and ports are operational, but international sanctions create additional banking, insurance, shipping and compliance exposure.

These factors do not make the Iranian corridor unavailable.

They simply demonstrate that every corridor carries a different combination of geographical, regulatory and geopolitical cost.

South Through Afghanistan: Two Maritime Possibilities

Afghanistan potentially provides Uzbekistan with access toward both Iran and Pakistan.

Road connectivity exists, while the continuous railway systems required for large-scale freight remain incomplete.

In the west, the Khaf–Herat railway provides the beginnings of an Afghan connection with Iran.

In the north, Uzbekistan is already connected by rail through Hairatan toward Mazar-i-Sharif.

The major missing connection between these systems remains the Afghan internal railway network.

If a Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat connection is eventually completed, Uzbekistan could obtain another railway route toward Iran that bypasses Turkmenistan.

Toward the southeast, the prospective Trans-Afghan system would connect Uzbekistan through Afghanistan toward Pakistan and the Arabian Sea.

This illustrates again why Uzbekistan’s strategy should not be interpreted as choosing one southern port.

It is seeking multiple gateways.

The Pakistan Route Has Already Demonstrated Demand

The Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor is not entirely theoretical.

Uzbekistan–Pakistan road freight reached approximately 354,000 tonnes in 2023, reportedly around 6.5 times its earlier level.

This growth occurred without a completed Trans-Afghan railway.

Uzbekistan has accordingly identified Termez as an important gateway for southbound trade.

The long-term commercial logic is clear:

Uzbekistan → Afghanistan → Pakistan → Karachi/Port Qasim

But the route currently demonstrates the difference between geographical availability and commercial reliability.

Geopolitics Is Redirecting Freight

Pakistan–Afghanistan political and security tensions have repeatedly disrupted border operations.

This matters beyond bilateral Afghanistan–Pakistan trade.

Central Asian exporters and importers cannot build dependable supply chains around a corridor whose principal international gateway can remain closed or severely restricted because of geopolitical disputes.

When one corridor becomes unavailable, freight does not simply stop.

It searches for another route.

The present disruption of the Afghanistan–Pakistan gateway therefore strengthens the immediate commercial relevance of the Middle Corridor and other available routes through Iran and Central Asia.

This does not mean Central Asia has permanently abandoned access through Pakistan.

It demonstrates why Uzbekistan’s policy of maintaining several corridors simultaneously is economically rational.

Temporary diversions can also have long-term consequences.

Once shippers establish contracts with new carriers, warehouses, terminals, Customs brokers, ports and shipping lines on another route, returning that cargo to the original corridor becomes progressively more difficult.

Pakistan Provides an Important Policy Comparison

Pakistan is relevant to this analysis not because TFN should advocate one corridor over another, but because it provides an illuminating comparison.

Uzbekistan is double-landlocked.

Pakistan possesses direct access to the Arabian Sea.

Yet CAREC’s comparable 2023 road-corridor data show a striking difference.

Uzbekistan’s average road-border clearance time was approximately 4.7 hours.

Pakistan’s was approximately 33.1 hours.

Uzbekistan’s average border-clearance cost was around $50.

Pakistan’s was approximately $238.

Yet their underlying CAREC road-transport cost for a standard 20-tonne shipment over 500 kilometres was almost identical:

Uzbekistan: $568. Pakistan: $569.

This is perhaps the most revealing comparison in the entire dataset.

The underlying transport cost was virtually the same.

The difference appeared in system performance.

Uzbekistan’s effective corridor speed was approximately 33.2 km/h.

Pakistan’s was approximately 11.4 km/h.

Uzbekistan therefore achieved an effective road-corridor speed almost three times Pakistan’s, despite being double-landlocked.

Pakistan’s measured average border-clearance time was approximately seven times longer, while its border-clearance cost was almost five times higher.

This does not establish that every Uzbek border performs better than every Pakistani border.

It demonstrates something more important:

Geographical advantage does not automatically translate into logistics advantage.

Distance Is Only One Variable

Our comparison between the Iranian and Pakistani maritime outlets illustrates the same principle.

The working road distance from Tashkent to Bandar Abbas is approximately 2,827 kilometres.

The working estimate through Afghanistan to Karachi is approximately 3,250 kilometres.

Pakistan is therefore around:

423 kilometres—or approximately 15 percent—farther by road.

But 423 kilometres at an effective driving speed of 40 km/h represents only approximately:

10.6 additional driving hours.

A prolonged border delay can consume more time than the entire geographical difference.

One restrictive permit system can do the same.

One forced transloading operation can do the same.

One geopolitical closure can eliminate the route entirely.

Consequently, corridor competitiveness should not be measured as kilometres alone.

A more realistic equation is:

Distance + transport cost + border time + permits + transit restrictions + security + sanctions exposure + reliability + maritime connectivity + backhaul availability.

The lowest combined burden wins the cargo.

What Multi-Million-Tonne Transit Actually Means

Uzbekistan’s target of attracting another 15–20 million tonnes of transit traffic is easier to understand when translated into physical logistics.

Using a standard analytical payload of 20 tonnes per loaded heavy vehicle, every one million tonnes represents approximately 50,000 loaded truck-equivalent movements.

Three million tonnes represents around 150,000 movements.

Five million tonnes represents approximately 250,000 movements, equivalent to roughly 685 loaded truck movements every day.

Ten million tonnes represents around 500,000 movements, or approximately 1,370 per day.

At these volumes, a road-only transit strategy becomes increasingly inefficient.

Rail, intermodal terminals, dry ports, container depots and logistics centres become essential.

Assuming approximately 2,000 tonnes per freight train purely for scenario analysis, five million tonnes would represent around 2,500 loaded trains annually, or approximately seven trains per day.

Transit policy therefore quickly becomes infrastructure policy, industrial policy and investment policy.

The Economic Multiplier

Uzbekistan’s government estimates that attracting another 15–20 million tonnes of transit cargo could generate $400–600 million of additional annual revenue.

At the boundaries of those projections, this represents roughly $20–40 per tonne.

The government also associates the programme with approximately $3 billion in logistics-centre investment and 50,000 jobs.

The precise methodology behind those projections is not sufficiently public to transfer the same ratios automatically to other countries.

But the principle is clear.

Transit creates value through:

transport, railway operations, warehousing, container handling, freight forwarding, insurance, banking, fuel, vehicle maintenance, cold chains, terminals and digital logistics services.

The economic objective is therefore not simply to collect a fee from cargo crossing national territory.

It is to build an economy around the movement of that cargo.

What Is Accelerating Uzbekistan’s Success?

The datasets point toward policy rather than geography as the main accelerator.

First is corridor diversification. Uzbekistan is deliberately maintaining several routes rather than seeking dependence on one.

Second is border reform. The measurable reduction in border cost and improvement in effective corridor speed demonstrate the commercial impact.

Third is development of logistics infrastructure. Twenty-seven logistics centres and 27.2 million tonnes of capacity provide a base, while the government continues identifying deficiencies instead of assuming the system is complete.

Fourth is development of national transport capacity. Uzbekistan has been expanding the participation of its domestic international carriers.

Fifth is railway diversification, including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan project and prospective connections through Afghanistan.

Sixth is digitalisation through electronic permits, cargo information exchange, border monitoring and international transit systems.

But the most important policy choice may be conceptual:

Uzbekistan treats transit as an exportable service.

That changes the government’s relationship with freight.

Cargo is not merely something to control.

It is something to attract.

From Double-Landlocked to Multi-Corridor

Uzbekistan’s 33.5 million tonnes of SCO freight is therefore not simply a story about increasing trade within one regional organisation.

It is evidence of a broader transformation in Eurasian logistics.

The country’s 1.61 billion tonnes of total freight, 15.3 million tonnes of transit traffic, 54-percent transit growth since 2021, 27 logistics centres, declining border costs and expanding international corridors point toward the same policy direction.

Uzbekistan is trying to convert a severe geographical constraint into an economic function.

Its strategy is not based on finding one perfect corridor.

It is based on creating choice.

North through Kazakhstan and Russia.

East toward China.

West through the Middle Corridor.

Southwest through Turkmenistan and Iran.

South through Afghanistan toward Iran and Pakistan.

Each corridor has advantages.

Each has weaknesses.

And each provides insurance against disruption of another.

For other countries—including those with direct maritime access—the lesson is significant.

Ports do not automatically create transit economies. Roads do not automatically create corridors. And geographical location does not automatically create logistics competitiveness.

The decisive factors are the policies governing how easily cargo can enter, cross and leave a country.

Uzbekistan’s experience increasingly suggests a simple principle:

Geography creates potential. Trade facilitation converts it into traffic.

For the emerging Eurasian logistics system, the strongest position may therefore belong not to the country offering the shortest route, but to the country offering traders the greatest number of open, predictable, efficient and commercially interchangeable routes.

That is how a double-landlocked country can begin behaving like a Eurasian transit hub.

Trade Facilitation Network (TFN) Research & Policy Analysis — International Trade, Transport and Logistics