Pakistan is a country whose economy has consistently been projected as agriculture-based, yet it is currently facing an annual loss of approximately 6 billion US dollars in foreign exchange due to the import of edible oil, exposing a deep structural weakness in its agricultural and economic framework. Despite this heavy financial outflow, the country possesses vast fertile lands, one of the most extensive and historically established irrigation systems in the world, four distinct seasons that allow year-round crop diversification, millions of acres of cultivable and irrigated land, and a large pool of trained agricultural experts. In addition, there exist dozens of agricultural research institutions, universities dedicated to agricultural sciences, seed certification bodies, extension services, and a heavily structured bureaucratic network operating at both federal and provincial levels. Over the decades, successive governments have repeatedly claimed that agriculture is the backbone of the national economy and that food security remains a top policy priority.

Despite this extensive institutional and natural infrastructure, the country has failed to achieve self-sufficiency in one of its most essential food commodities—edible oil.

This is not a marginal shortfall but a structural failure embedded deep within policy design, implementation mechanisms, and institutional performance.

It reflects the inefficient utilization of available resources, weak coordination among institutions, inconsistent policy direction, and a persistent lack of accountability in execution. As a result, Pakistan is currently dependent on imports for nearly 90 percent of its edible oil requirements, while domestic production contributes only about 10 percent, exposing a severe vulnerability in both food security and external account stability.

This situation is not a temporary market imbalance. It is the outcome of decades of poor governance, fragmented agricultural planning, weak research linkage, and misplaced policy priorities. The annual import bill of approximately 6 billion US dollars—representing a continuous and irreversible loss of foreign exchange reserves every year—is not just a trade figure; it reflects a persistent financial drain that weakens the national economy, increases external dependency, and deepens macroeconomic vulnerability over time.
Edible oil is not a luxury item; it is a basic dietary necessity consumed by every household across all socio-economic classes.

In such a context, the critical question arises: how has an agricultural country become so heavily dependent on imports for such a fundamental commodity, while simultaneously losing 6 billion dollars annually in foreign exchange for its procurement?

This is the core question that no government, policy document, or institution has been willing to answer honestly.

Pakistan has immense potential for oilseed cultivation such as sunflower, canola, mustard, soybean, and others. However, no consistent or integrated national policy has ever been implemented to convert this potential into reality. Farmers have consistently been deprived of quality seeds, profitable support prices, stable markets, and effective translation of research into practice. As a result, the farming community remains trapped in a subsistence-based agricultural cycle rather than progressing toward profitability and growth.

It is also an undeniable reality that Pakistan’s agricultural policy has largely operated on a reactive basis. Crises emerge, noise is created, meetings are held, reports are produced, committees are formed, and then everything returns to silence and stagnation.

This cycle of discontinuity has pushed the agricultural sector into a structural trap where development remains a dream and failure becomes a permanent reality.

A similar pattern of failure has already been witnessed in the cotton sector, where Pakistan once held a strong global position but has now become dependent on imported raw material. The same model is now being repeated in edible oil. This is not coincidence; it is a continuation of systemic policy failure.

At this point, a fundamental question arises: if Pakistan produces only 10 percent of its edible oil needs, on what basis can it still be called an agricultural country? An agricultural country is defined not by land or climate, but by self-sufficiency, productivity, and sustainable agricultural growth. By this standard, Pakistan’s agricultural model appears hollow and largely rhetorical.

Institutions such as the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC), along with other major agricultural research bodies, cannot be absolved of responsibility. Their primary mandate was to link research with productivity. However, despite substantial budgets, infrastructure, and human resources, there has been no meaningful breakthrough in oilseed development, no significant increase in productivity, and no effective transfer of research to the farming community. These institutions have become symbols of stagnation rather than drivers of progress.

Federal and provincial governments are equally responsible for this failure.

Lack of policy continuity, absence of clear priorities, and weak institutional coordination have paralyzed the entire system. A dangerous trend has developed where responsibility is avoided rather than accepted. The federal level formulates policy but blames the provinces for weak implementation, while provinces cite lack of resources and authority.

This continuous blame game has created a governance vacuum where policies exist on paper, but implementation is missing; institutions exist, but outcomes are absent; and budgets exist, but impact is negligible.

This is the point where governance loses credibility. When responsibility exists without accountability, systems do not reform—they collapse further.

This situation is no longer a simple agricultural shortfall. It has evolved into a full-scale state, institutional, and policy failure. When a country that calls itself agricultural produces only 10 percent of its edible oil needs and transfers nearly 6 billion US dollars every year in foreign exchange to importing economies, it is not a sectoral issue but a systemic collapse. The claim of being an “agricultural country” becomes a hollow slogan with no economic or practical foundation.

The most painful and fundamental question is this: why is there still no real accountability for this persistent failure, the annual loss of 6 billion dollars in foreign exchange, and the continued decline of the agricultural sector? Where are the institutions, commissions, policy forums, and oversight mechanisms that were created to prevent such systemic weaknesses, ensure monitoring, and enforce timely corrective action? Have they reduced their responsibilities merely to files, meetings, and routine reports? Why have these glaring and continuous failures failed to become a national priority? And why have the very systems established to safeguard the national interest either become silent spectators or been buried under procedural formalities?

The reality is that the issue is not merely weak policy or insufficient resources, but a deep and systemic accountability vacuum, where responsibilities exist but enforceable consequences do not. It is this silence, institutional indifference, and bureaucratic inertia that constitute the greatest failure of the entire system. Unless this gap is filled through a strong, transparent, and result-oriented accountability framework, agricultural self-sufficiency will remain unattainable, and this continuous drain of 6 billion US dollars in foreign exchange annually will persist unchecked.

Dr. Alamdar Hussain Malik
Former Secretary/Registrar (Retired), Pakistan Veterinary Medical Council
Former Financial Advisor, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan