When does security stop being a response to conflict and become a way of governing everyday life? This question is particularly relevant in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), where security has remained central to political discourse for decades. India presents counter-terrorism, territorial integrity and public order as essential security concerns. Yet when security becomes the dominant framework for addressing political questions, its effects extend beyond armed conflict. It can shape political participation, freedom of expression, mobility, livelihoods and the daily experiences of Kashmiris.

The concept of securitisation helps explain this process. It refers to the process through which an issue is presented as an existential threat, allowing extraordinary measures to be justified. In IIOJK, political dissent, public mobilisation and other forms of opposition have often been viewed through a national security lens. The issue is not the existence of security concerns themselves. States have a legitimate responsibility to protect people from violence. The deeper concern is what happens when exceptional security practices become normal features of political governance.

One clear consequence of securitisation is arbitrary detention. The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act provides a legal framework for detention outside ordinary criminal trial procedures. The use of these kinds of powers shows how security considerations can shape the legal and political sphere. Indian government data recorded 5,400 prisoners in IIOJK against a sanctioned capacity of 3,629, indicating occupancy of almost 149 per cent. These figures raise questions about whether security policies are producing long-term stability or contributing to fear and uncertainty.

The case of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) leader Yasin Malik is a striking example of the securitisation of political dissent. He has remained in Tihar Jail since 2019 and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2022. The National Investigation Agency has appealed for the sentence to be enhanced to death. Malik’s continued imprisonment and his decision to contest the proceedings without relying on a conventional legal defence have also raised serious questions about his confidence in the judicial process. In a 2026 proceeding, the Delhi High Court was still considering the NIA’s appeal for a death sentence. The case shows how the boundaries between political dissent, security policy and criminal justice can become deeply contested in IIOJK. The concern is not simply punishing an individual, but the wider political meaning of treating a conflict-related political figure primarily through the framework of national security.
The effects of securitisation are also visible in everyday movement and economic life. Kashmiris do not experience the conflict only through major political or military events. They also experience it through checkpoints, restrictions, permits and uncertainty surrounding cross-LoC interaction. The Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service shows this tension. It helped reconnect divided families and created space for people-to-people contact. Cross-LoC trade, launched in 2008, similarly created opportunities for traders and communities on both sides of the Line of Control. However, the Indian government suspended the trade in 2019. In May 2026, renewed calls for its restoration showed that these mechanisms matter not only for commerce but also for social confidence and local livelihoods.

This creates a central security paradox. A policy may strengthen the state’s ability to control territory while creating insecurity in the everyday lives of civilians. State security and human security are therefore not automatically the same. A territory may be more tightly controlled while people remain politically insecure, economically uncertain or unable to express themselves freely. Human security requires more than the absence of armed violence. It also includes dignity, political participation, freedom from fear and the ability to live an ordinary life without constant exposure to exceptional security measures.

Kashmiris, however, should not be viewed only as passive victims of securitisation. They continue to exercise agency under difficult conditions. Families maintain relationships across political and physical divisions. Traders build economic networks, while Communities adapt to restrictions and try to maintain their social ties. People also use available political and civic spaces available to them to express their concerns. These actions can be understood through the idea of everyday peace, which looks at how ordinary people manage conflict and sustain social relations. This form of agency shows that peace is not produced only through agreements between governments. It can also emerge through the daily choices of people living with conflict.

The future of Kashmir therefore cannot be discussed only in the language of territorial security. A broader understanding of security is needed. Counter-terrorism measures should operate within legal and human rights safeguards. Peaceful political expression should not automatically be treated as a security threat. Most importantly, Kashmiris should be recognised as political actors rather than merely as subjects of competing Indian and Pakistani security narratives.

The central challenge is not to reject security, but to redefine it. Security should protect people as well as territory. Peace should create political space as well as reduce violence. Confidence-building should involve societies as well as states. The real test of security in IIOJK is not simply whether the state feels secure. It is whether Kashmiris can speak, move, participate and live without fear.

The writer is a Research Assistant at the Kashmir Institute of International Relations (KIIR).